

# Homomorphic Rank Sort Using Surrogate Polynomials

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**Abstract.** In this paper we propose a rank based algorithm for sorting encrypted data using monomials. Greedy Sort is a sorting technique that achieves to minimize the depth of the homomorphic evaluations. It is a costly algorithm due to excessive ciphertext multiplications and its implementation is cumbersome. Another method Direct Sort has a slightly deeper circuit than Greedy Sort, nevertheless it is simpler to implement and scales better with the size of the input array. Our proposed method minimizes both the circuit depth and the number of ciphertext multiplications. In addition to its performance, its simple design makes it more favorable compared to the alternative methods which are hard to parallelize, e.g. not suitable for fast GPU implementations. Furthermore, we improve the performance of homomorphic sorting algorithm by adapting the SIMD operations alongside message slot rotation techniques. This method allow us to pack  $N$  integers into a single ciphertext and compute  $N$  comparisons at once, thus reducing  $\mathcal{O}(N^2)$  comparisons to  $\mathcal{O}(N)$ .

**Keywords:** Data privacy, encrypted computing, fully homomorphic encryption, homomorphic sorting

## 1 Introduction

Blind sort is basically arranging a set of encrypted integers in order by using a somewhat, leveled or Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme [1–7, 10, 11, 13–15, 18, 20, 23] without knowledge of neither the plaintext data or the secret key used in encryption. The operations do not require decryption either. The crucial drawback of using FHE schemes in practice is their poor performance in high-level computations due to the high noise growth at the end of deep circuit evaluations. Most recent FHE schemes make use of noise reduction techniques in order to overcome this problem by setting the FHE parameters to evaluate only up to a certain depth. As a result, deep circuits require large parameters and they perform poorly.

In [8], Çetin et al. analyze different sorting algorithms and compare their performances for ordering encrypted data. Their survey include well-known algorithms such as Bubble Sort, Merge Sort and two sorting networks: Bitonic Sort

and Odd-Even Merge Sort [19]. Due to the high depths of known algorithms, the authors propose two new depth-optimized methods: Greedy Sort and Direct Sort. Both of these algorithms require a circuit of depth  $\mathcal{O}(\log(N) + \log(\ell))$  where  $N$  is the number of elements and  $\ell$  is the bit-length of the elements. Other encrypted sorting works in the literature are of Chatterjee et al. [9] and Emmadi et al.'s [12]. In [9], the authors introduce a hybrid technique, i.e. Lazy Sort. This method first uses Bubble Sort to nearly sort the input elements. Then, the list is sorted again by using Insertion Sort. The authors claim that this method has better complexity than the worst case scenario. This is refuted by both [8] and [12]. Emmadi et al. implements and compares Bubble Sort, Insertion Sort, Bitonic Sort and Odd-Even Merge Sort in [12] and their observations are parallel with the analysis of [8]. Recently, Narumanchi et al. compared bitwise and integer-wise encryption within the context of comparison and sorting in [21]. Their analysis shows that it is more efficient to use bitwise encryption in terms of performance.

All the previous works still perform poorly in case of sorting a large data set. In the experiments, the largest  $N$  used is around 64, i.e. there is no known result for sorting 2,3 orders of magnitude. The first contribution of this work is adapting Single-Instruction Multiple-Data (SIMD) techniques from [22] to evaluate parallel comparisons. In previous works, batching is used to sort separate number sets simultaneously. This results in not taking advantage of batching when there is only one set to be sorted. In this work, we propose placing the set elements into message slots of a single plaintext and using rotation method from [16] when across-slot computation is required. Gentry et.al. used this technique to evaluate an AES circuit homomorphically in [17]. This method requires key switching after every rotation. However we are able to reduce the number of comparison evaluations from  $N^2$  to  $N$ . The main contribution of this work is proposing an alternative way of computing the Hamming weight of  $N$  bits with only  $N$  ciphertext multiplications. In comparison Direct Sort and Greedy Sort require  $\mathcal{O}(N \log N)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(2^N)$  multiplications, respectively. Thus, our proposed method executes Direct Sort steps with the minimum number of operations. We observe that our proposed method is also a compact implementation of Greedy Sort. Thus, it minimizes the circuit depth as well as the number of homomorphic evaluations. In addition to performance improvements, the proposed algorithm is easier to analyze and implement in comparison to previous methods. Even when batching is not applicable, the highly parallelizable nature of the algorithm makes it an efficient candidate for the best performance on GPU implementations.

## 2 Background

Following a similar notation to [16,17,22], we define the plaintexts with lowercase letters  $a \in \mathbb{A}_p$ , batched plaintexts with Greek letters  $\alpha \in \mathbb{A}_p$  and the ciphertexts with uppercase letters  $A \in \mathbb{A}_q$  where  $\mathbb{A}_p = \mathbb{Z}_p/\Phi_m(X)$  and  $\mathbb{A}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q/\Phi_m(X)$ . We use prime  $p, q$  in our scheme and  $\Phi_m(X)$  is the  $m^{\text{th}}$  cyclotomic polynomial.

Given two ciphertexts  $A, B$  that are encrypted under an FHE scheme, computing  $A + B$  and  $A \times B$  in  $\mathbb{A}_q$  gives us encryptions of  $a + b$  and  $a \times b$  in  $\mathbb{A}_p$ .

When a number  $a$  has  $k$  base- $p$  digits, we use an array index notation to represent its digits  $[a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{k-1}]$  and  $a = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} p^i a_i$ . An encryption of  $a$  would be a vector of ciphertexts with encryptions of its digits, i.e.  $[A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{k-1}]$ . When there is a list of numbers, we use the double-indexed positioning with the first one being the number's position and the second one is for the digit's index. For instance, a plaintext  $\alpha_{i,j}$  is the  $j^{\text{th}}$  digit of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  number and similarly  $A_{i,j}$  is an encryption of the  $j^{\text{th}}$  digit of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  number.

## 2.1 Batching and Rotation of the Message Slots

From [22], we know that with specific parameters we can enable batching, a technique that is used for parallel evaluations in the message slots. For example, when we choose the cyclotomic polynomial with  $m$  that divides  $p^d - 1$  with smallest such  $d$ , we have the factorization,

$$\Phi_m(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} F_i(X) \pmod{p}$$

where  $F_i$ 's are  $\ell = \phi(m)/d$  irreducible polynomials of degree  $d$ . Then we have the isomorphism in between the plaintext space and the  $\ell$  copies of  $\mathbb{F}_{p^d}$ .

$$\mathbb{A}_p \cong \frac{\mathbb{F}_p[X]}{F_1} \otimes \dots \otimes \frac{\mathbb{F}_p[X]}{F_\ell}$$

We define a vector with  $\ell$  messages  $\alpha = \langle \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell \rangle$  with each  $\alpha_i$  belonging to the field  $\mathbb{L}_i = \frac{\mathbb{F}_p[X]}{F_i}$ . Applying inverse Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), we derive a single message in  $\mathbb{A}_p$ . We write this as:

$$\alpha = \text{CRT}^{-1}(\langle \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell \rangle)$$

with  $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{L}_i$  and  $\alpha \in \mathbb{A}_p$ . We say the plaintext has  $\ell$  message slots and each message is packed in a single slot. Additions and multiplications over CRT plaintexts will be evaluated in each slot due to the natural isomorphism. For example given another plaintext  $\beta = \text{CRT}^{-1}(\beta)$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CRT}(\alpha + \beta) &= \langle \alpha_1 + \beta_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell + \beta_\ell \rangle \\ \text{CRT}(\alpha \times \beta) &= \langle \alpha_1 \times \beta_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell \times \beta_\ell \rangle . \end{aligned}$$

with  $\alpha_i \star \beta_i \in \mathbb{L}_i$  and  $\star \in \{+, \times\}$ . In some applications, we need to do computation across message slots, i.e.  $\alpha_i \star \beta_j$  where  $i \neq j$ . To this end, we permute the message slots so that message  $i$  and message  $j$  aligns. Due to the relation in between the factors of the cyclotomic polynomial, the automorphism

$$\kappa_g : \alpha(X) \mapsto \alpha(x^g) \pmod{\Phi_m(X)}$$

for a  $g$  that is not a power of 2 in  $(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$  with order  $\ell$  performs a permutation. To see why this works and for the underlying Galois field theory we refer readers to [16].

## 2.2 Problem Definition and Existing Algorithms

**Encrypted Sorting Problem:** Given an unordered set of encrypted elements  $\{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{N-1}\}$ , we want to find an ordered set of encrypted elements  $\{B_0, B_1, \dots, B_{N-1}\}$  where the decrypted list  $\{b_0, \dots, b_{N-1}\}$  is a permutation of  $\{a_0, \dots, a_{N-1}\}$  with nondecreasing order, i.e.  $b_0 \leq b_1 \leq \dots \leq b_{N-1}$ .

In the following part of this section, we will briefly describe the previously proposed methods to solve the encrypted sorting problem. Before the algorithm descriptions, we shall define a comparator. In order to sort a set of elements, we need to be able to compare two numbers with respect to their magnitude. In [8], where the input elements are bitwise encrypted, this comparison is converted to a binary circuit as follows<sup>1</sup>:

$$A < B = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} (A_i \oplus 1) B_i \prod_{j=i+1}^{k-1} (A_j \oplus B_j \oplus 1) \quad (1)$$

where  $A_i, B_i$  are the encryptions of  $i^{\text{th}}$  bit of  $k$  bit numbers  $a$  and  $b$ , respectively. The decryption of  $A < B$  outputs a 1 if  $a < b$  and a 0 otherwise.

**Greedy Sort** In [8], authors propose Greedy Sort as an alternative method to classical sorting algorithms, due to its low circuit depth. However, due to the algorithm's exhaustive nature, the method is not efficient when implemented without optimizations. In this section, we describe the algorithm and later in Section 3, we propose our optimization that minimizes the total number of ciphertext multiplications.

Greedy Sort works by computing every possible permutation of the input set. In order to find the minimum element  $b_0$ , one needs to compare each  $a_i$  to every other element in the set. If it is smaller than all  $a_j$ s where  $i \neq j$ , then we can conclude it is the smallest element and set  $b_0 = a_i$ . Similarly, in order to find the next smallest element  $b_1$ , we need to compare every  $a_i$  to every other element and if it is smaller than all but one, then we know that it is the second minimum and set  $b_1 = a_i$ . We can follow the same idea until the last element of the sorted array  $b_{n-1}$  which is the maximum element is found.

This method requires comparison of every pair in the set, thus the initial step is to build a matrix  $M$  that holds the comparison outputs. Entries of this matrix, let them be  $M_{i,j}$ s are evaluated using the binary circuit given in Equation 1 such that  $M_{i,j} = A_i < A_j$ . Here, note that  $M_{i,j}$ s and  $M_{j,i}$ s naturally complement each other<sup>2</sup> and  $M_{i,i}$ s are always zero. Therefore  $M_{i,j}$ s are only evaluated for  $i < j$ . Given the comparison matrix, the ordered elements are computed as follows:

$$B_r = \theta_{r,0}A_0 + \dots + \theta_{r,N-1}A_{N-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \theta_{r,i}A_i$$

<sup>1</sup> If the plaintext modulus  $p$  is initialized as 2, an XOR “ $\oplus$ ” operation is performed via addition. Otherwise,  $A \oplus B = A + B - 2(A \times B)$  and  $A \oplus 1 = 1 - A$ .

<sup>2</sup>  $M_{j,i} = M_{i,j} \oplus 1$

where

$$\theta_{r,i} = \sum_{\substack{k_1=0 \\ k_1 \neq i}}^{N-r-1} M_{k_1,i} \cdots \sum_{\substack{k_r=k_{r-1}+1 \\ k_r \neq i}}^{N-1} M_{k_r,i} \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i \\ j \neq k_1, \dots, k_r}}^{N-1} M_{i,j}. \quad (2)$$

$\theta_{r,i}$  values can be seen as the binary place indicators or a decision flag that indicates whether the input  $A_i$  will be mapped to output  $B_r$ . In other words, if the input  $A_i$  has the rank  $r$ , it is an encrypted one. This requires computation of all  $\theta_{r,i}$ s for  $i, r = 0, \dots, N-1$ , thus making the method inefficient. The Greedy Sort algorithm steps can be seen in Appendix C of [8].

**Direct Sort** In the same work [8], the authors propose another low-depth method for sorting, i.e. Direct Sort. The algorithm implements Rank Sort in the homomorphic setting. The first step is constructing the same comparison matrix  $M$  as in Greedy Sort. Then, it computes the ranks by performing a column-wise summation of the entries of  $M$ . Since the elements of  $M$  are bits, the summation result gives the Hamming weights of the columns of  $M$ . It is implemented using a Wallace Tree of depth  $\mathcal{O}(\log_{3/2} N)$ . The challenge is having the rank values encrypted after this step. This requires an additional homomorphic equality check to place the elements in the output in an ordered manner. This equality check is performed on rank values which are  $\log N$  bit numbers, hence requires a homomorphic evaluation of depth  $\log \log N$ . The method can be found in Algorithm 1 in [8].

### 3 Our Proposal: Polynomial Rank Sort

In a nutshell, the idea is to use the rank of an input as the degree of a monomial –which we call a *rank monomial*– and place the input element in the coefficient of the monomial.

**Definition.** Given an input set  $\{a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{N-1}\}$  with  $N$  elements, let  $r_i$  be the rank of  $a_i$  in the set, we call  $\rho_i(x) = x^{r_i}$  the *rank monomial* of integer  $a_i$ .

**Claim.** If we can find the rank monomials  $\{x^{r_0}, x^{r_1}, \dots, x^{r_{N-1}}\}$  of all of the set elements, then we can have an output polynomial with input elements lined up in its coefficients with respect to their rank:

$$\begin{aligned} b(x) &= \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} a_i \rho_i(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} a_i x^{r_i} \\ &= b_0 + b_1 x + \cdots + b_{N-1} x^{N-1} \end{aligned}$$

with  $b_0 \leq b_1 \leq \cdots \leq b_{N-1}$ .

**Proof Sketch.** To see why this works, note that the ranks of the inputs are a permutation of natural numbers in the range  $[0, N - 1]$ . Thus, there is a bijective mapping in between the  $i$  and  $r_i$  values. The same mapping gives us the ordered permutation of the input elements, i.e.  $b_{r_i} = a_i$ . Bijection ensures the exclusive positions of each input element in the output polynomial.

**Challenge.** Implementing this method on private data has two challenges: finding the ranks of encrypted inputs and placing the encrypted rank values in the exponent. In the following section, we propose a solution to this problem.

### 3.1 Finding Rank Monomials

In order to show how the algorithm works, first we assume that the inputs are not encrypted. After demonstrating the steps of the method, we show how to implement it for encrypted data, i.e. by using only homomorphic operations.

We shortly describe the method as follows: For an  $N$ -element input set, we start by finding the zero-based rankings in each 2-subset, being either 0 or 1. We start by constructing surrogate monomials using these ranks. Then, we merge the subsets by performing polynomial multiplication among the surrogates. At the end, this gives us the rank monomials of each input element.

Initially, we consider the base case: an input set with only two elements  $\{a, b\}$ . We say the rank of  $a$  is  $r_a$  and rank of  $b$  is  $r_b$  with the rank monomials defined as:

$$\rho_a(x) = x^{r_a} \quad \text{and} \quad \rho_b(x) = x^{r_b} .$$

If, for instance, the input elements have the relation  $a < b$ , then we can write  $r_a = 0$  and  $r_b = 1$  and  $\rho_a = 1$ ,  $\rho_b = x$ , respectively.

Now, we include a third element  $c$  in the input set. In this case, the first step is to find the ranks in each 2-subset. We look at all two element subsets;  $\{a, b\}$ ,  $\{a, c\}$  and  $\{b, c\}$  and define the following surrogate monomials:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_{ab}(x) &= x^{r_{ab}} & \rho_{ba}(x) &= x^{r_{ba}} \\ \rho_{ac}(x) &= x^{r_{ac}} & \rho_{ca}(x) &= x^{r_{ca}} \\ \rho_{bc}(x) &= x^{r_{bc}} & \rho_{cb}(x) &= x^{r_{cb}} \end{aligned}$$

where  $r_{ij}$  is the rank of input  $i$  in the 2-subset  $\{i, j\}$  and  $\rho_{ij}$  is the rank monomial of the same element in the same subset. The next step is merging two subsets to find the final rank monomials. Multiplying two surrogates adjusts the degree of the rank monomial depending on the subset-wise rank values. When we want to find the rank monomial for a particular input, we multiply each surrogate that is pertinent to that element:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_a &= \rho_{ab} \cdot \rho_{ac} = x^{r_{ab}+r_{ac}} \\ \rho_b &= \rho_{ba} \cdot \rho_{bc} = x^{r_{ba}+r_{bc}} \\ \rho_c &= \rho_{ca} \cdot \rho_{cb} = x^{r_{ca}+r_{cb}} \end{aligned}$$

Following the previous example with  $a < b$ , we fix the following relations and the partial rank monomials for the set where  $c < a < b$ :

$$\begin{aligned} a < b &\Leftrightarrow \rho_{ab}(x) = 1, \quad \rho_{ba}(x) = x \\ c < a &\Leftrightarrow \rho_{ac}(x) = x, \quad \rho_{ca}(x) = 1 \\ c < b &\Leftrightarrow \rho_{bc}(x) = x, \quad \rho_{cb}(x) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Then the rank monomials will be:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_a &= \rho_{ab} \cdot \rho_{ac} = x \\ \rho_b &= \rho_{ba} \cdot \rho_{bc} = x^2 \\ \rho_c &= \rho_{ca} \cdot \rho_{cb} = 1 . \end{aligned}$$

If we examine the degrees of the monomials, we find that the ranks are:  $r_a = 1$ ,  $r_b = 2$  and  $r_c = 0$  which are consistent with the given relation  $c < a < b$ .

We now generalize this method to an  $N$ -element input set by defining the following surrogate monomials for each input element  $a_i$ :

$$\rho_{ij}(x) = x^{r_{ij}} \quad (3)$$

for all 2-subsets  $\{a_i, a_j\}$  that contain  $a_i$ , i.e.  $\forall j \in [0, N-1]$  and  $j \neq i$ . Then, computing the product of all the surrogates would carry the overall rank of  $a_i$  in the power of:

$$\rho_i(x) = \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} \rho_{ij}(x) . \quad (4)$$

The degree of  $\rho_i(x)$  is the rank of  $a_i$  in the  $N$ -element set. This operation can be viewed as increasing the rank by one whenever an element  $a_i$  is larger than another element. In other words, it is counting the number of smaller elements, i.e. the rank of  $a_i$ .

**Connection to Direct Sort** This method is equivalent to summing the column entries of the comparison matrix  $M$ , i.e. computing the Hamming weights, as performed in Direct Sort (see Algorithm 1 in [8]). In order to see this connection, we must first confirm that comparison matrix elements  $m_{ij}$  and 2-subset ranks  $r_{ij}$  complement each other. This is because  $m_{ij}$  is the Boolean output of the comparison  $a_i < a_j$ , which is 1 if and only if  $a_i$  is smaller than  $a_j$ . However  $r_{ij}$  is 0 in this case, since it is the smallest element in the same 2-set. Hence,  $r_{ij}$  and  $m_{ij}$  complement each other and we can assert that  $r_{ij} = m_{ji}$ . We expand the product as in Equation 5 and notice that the summation in the exponent is equivalent to the Hamming weight of the columns of  $M$ .

$$\rho_i(x) = \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} x^{r_{ij}} = x^{\sum_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} r_{ij}} = x^{\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} m_{ji}} \quad (5)$$

Until now, we have showed that we can find the rank monomials given the base case surrogates by applying polynomial multiplication. In the following section we describe how to apply this method to encrypted input sets.

### 3.2 Finding Rank Monomials in the Encrypted Domain

In the encrypted domain, we have a set of  $N$  encrypted numbers  $\{A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{N-1}\}$  by utilizing an FHE scheme. Recall that the first step of the proposed algorithm constructs the surrogates for all 2-subsets as in Equation 3. This requires finding the encrypted rank  $R_{ij}$  in set  $\{A_i, A_j\}$ . Hence we use the comparison circuit from Equation 1 and compute the encrypted rank of  $a_i$  as:

$$R_{ij} = 1 - (A_i \lessdot A_j)$$

Using this value, we can set the base case surrogate monomial using the following operation that requires arithmetic suitable for homomorphic evaluation:

$$P_{ij}(x) = 1 - R_{ij} + R_{ij} \cdot x \quad (6)$$

Rechecking the base case example with  $a < b$ , we can confirm that;

$$\begin{array}{ll} A \lessdot B = \llbracket 1 \rrbracket & B \lessdot A = \llbracket 0 \rrbracket \\ R_{ab} = \llbracket 0 \rrbracket & R_{ba} = \llbracket 1 \rrbracket \\ P_{ab}(x) = 1 - \llbracket 0 \rrbracket + \llbracket 0 \rrbracket x & P_{ba}(x) = 1 - \llbracket 1 \rrbracket + \llbracket 1 \rrbracket x \\ = \llbracket 1 \rrbracket & = \llbracket x \rrbracket \end{array}$$

What happens when two elements are equal to each other? Then, both  $A \lessdot B$  and  $B \lessdot A$  are expected to output a zero. To fix this problem, we always perform only the first comparison and fix the second comparison to its complement. In other words, computing first one of the ranks  $R_{ji} = A_i \lessdot A_j$  and setting the other  $R_{ij} = 1 - R_{ji}$  solves the equality problem by making sure that the ranks always complement each other. Thereby, we also avoid redundant homomorphic comparisons. Note that, in [8], only the upper half of the comparison matrix  $M$  is computed and the lower half entries are set as the complements. This is identical to computing  $R_{ij}$  for half of the element pairs.

The next step is to compute the final rank monomials by using Equation 4. This operation which only includes polynomial multiplication, can simply be evaluated using homomorphic evaluations:

$$P_i(x) = \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} P_{ij}(x) .$$

If we multiply each  $P_i$  with the corresponding input  $A_i$ , i.e. computing  $P_i A_i$ , we can place the element in the rank coefficient and since every rank  $r_i$  is exclusive



to an element, each element will be placed in a distinct coefficient. Thus, we can have an output polynomial  $B$  with the ordered elements in its coefficients:

$$B(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} A_i x^{r_i} = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} B_j x^j$$

where  $b_0 \leq b_1 \leq \dots \leq b_{N-1}$ . The overall algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1 with given encrypted input set and the set size  $N$ . In comparison to intricate Greedy Sort Algorithm given in Appendix C [8], the simplicity and elegance of Algorithm 1 makes it more favorable and convenient to implement and less troublesome to analyze. As we shall see in the next section, we also gain further in efficiency.

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**Algorithm 1** Polynomial Rank Sort
 

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**Input:**  $A, N$

**Output:**  $B(x)$

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 $B(x) \leftarrow 0$ 
for all  $A_i \in A$  do
  for all  $j > i$  do
     $M_{ij} \leftarrow A_i < A_j$ 
     $M_{ji} \leftarrow 1 - M_{ij}$ 
  end for
   $P_i(x) \leftarrow 1$ 
  for all  $j \neq i$  do
     $P_i(x) \leftarrow P_i(x) \times (M_{ij} + M_{ji}x)$ 
  end for
   $B(x) \leftarrow B(x) + A_i \times P_i(x)$ 
end for

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**Remark.** To see the connection to Greedy Sort, note that the coefficients of the product polynomial are the binary place indicator  $\theta_{r,i}$  values:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \rho_i(x) &= \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} \rho_{ij}(x) = \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} (m_{i,j} + m_{j,i}x) \\
 &= \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} m_{i,j} + \left[ \sum_{\substack{k=0 \\ k \neq i}}^{N-1} m_{k,i} \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i \\ j \neq k}}^{N-1} m_{i,j} \right] x \\
 &+ \dots + \left[ \prod_{\substack{j=0 \\ j \neq i}}^{N-1} m_{j,i} \right] x^{N-1}
 \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

## 4 Batching Input Elements

In this section, we describe how to pack input elements in the plaintexts to evaluate parallel comparisons in the message slots. All previously mentioned sorting algorithms require  $\frac{N^2-N}{2}$  comparisons. By enabling batching, we can reduce it to  $N-1$ . Finding the rank monomial of one element requires  $N-1$  ciphertext multiplications, thus finding all rank monomials requires  $N(N-1)$  multiplications. We also reduce this number to  $N-1$  with batching. Finally, when we encrypt the input elements, instead of having  $Nk$  encryptions, we only have  $k$  encryptions when batching is used, where  $k$  is the bit-length of the input elements. As a result, we have both a memory and performance gain with a factor of  $N$ . However, there is an additional cost of key switching that we need to perform after each rotation. This operation also increases the noise in the ciphertext, thus we try to limit the number of rotations.

For our application, we use the plaintext modulus  $p = 2$ . Choosing  $\Phi_m$  with  $m|2^d - 1$ , we utilize  $\ell$  message slots defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^d}$ . Next we choose a  $g \in (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$  with order  $\ell$ . We fix the first factor  $F_1(X)$  and reorder the rest of the factors so that the permutation given by  $\kappa_g$  is a cyclic shift to the left. There is an isomorphism in between the different slot fields, hence we can define a mapping in between  $\mathbb{L}_1$  and  $\mathbb{L}_i$  for each  $i$  as follows

$$\psi_i : \begin{cases} \mathbb{L}_1 \mapsto \mathbb{L}_i \\ X \mapsto X^{g^{(1-i) \bmod \ell}} \pmod{F_i(X)} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma &= \text{CRT}(\kappa_g(\alpha)) \\ &= \langle \alpha_2(x^g), \alpha_3(x^g) \cdots, \alpha_\ell(x^g), \alpha_1(x^g) \rangle \end{aligned}$$

where rotated vector slots are  $\gamma_i = \alpha_{(i+1 \bmod \ell)}(x^g) \in \mathbb{L}_i$ . When the rotation is applied  $j$  times, the resulting vector elements becomes  $\gamma_i = \alpha_{(i+j \bmod \ell)}(x^{g^j}) \in \mathbb{L}_i$ .

We also define a helpful basic operation to clear out a slot content. Clearing data in the slots can be performed with a logical AND operation by defining a bit-mask vector. If we want to clear the data in the  $i^{\text{th}}$  slot, we create a vector  $\zeta$  with  $\zeta_i = 0$  and  $\zeta_j = 1$  for all  $j \neq i$  and use its inverse CRT, i.e.  $\zeta = \text{CRT}^{-1}(\zeta)$ , to perform a logical AND with the input

$$\text{CRT}(\alpha \times \zeta) = \langle \alpha_1, \cdots, \alpha_{i-1}, 0, \alpha_{i+1}, \cdots, \alpha_{\ell-1} \rangle$$

Initially, we create a vector for each bit

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_0 &= \langle \alpha_{0,0}, \alpha_{1,0}, \cdots, \alpha_{N-1,0} \rangle \\ \alpha_1 &= \langle \alpha_{0,1}, \alpha_{1,1}, \cdots, \alpha_{N-1,1} \rangle \\ &\vdots \\ \alpha_{k-1} &= \langle \alpha_{0,k-1}, \alpha_{1,k-1}, \cdots, \alpha_{N-1,k-1} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

where the  $i^{\text{th}}$  slot is reserved for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  element. Hence, each plaintext corresponding to a bit is retrieved by the inverse CRT operation, i.e.  $\alpha_j = \mathbf{CRT}^{-1}(\alpha_j)$ , for  $j = 0, \dots, k-1$ . Hence a vector  $\alpha$  can be viewed as holding different elements in each slot

$$\alpha = \langle a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{N-1} \rangle$$

and  $\alpha$  is the batched plaintext with each element in a separate slot. In order to construct the comparison matrix we perform  $a_i < a_j$  for all  $i < j$ . We can attain the following vectors

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma &= \langle a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{N-2}, a_{N-1} \rangle \\ \gamma_1 &= \langle a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{N-1}, 0 \rangle \\ \gamma_2 &= \langle a_2, a_3, \dots, 0, 0 \rangle \\ &\vdots \\ \gamma_{N-1} &= \langle a_{N-1}, 0, \dots, 0, 0 \rangle \end{aligned}$$

by deploying the cyclic shift and clearing some message slot contents.

We can compute all comparisons by executing the comparison circuit for

$$\begin{aligned} m_1 &= \gamma \leq \gamma_1 \\ m_2 &= \gamma \leq \gamma_2 \\ &\vdots \\ m_{N-1} &= \gamma \leq \gamma_{N-1} \end{aligned}$$

#### 4.1 Comparison and Analysis

All three algorithms work by computing the comparison matrix  $M$ . Since that is a mutual step for all of the methods, we disregard the cost of constructing  $M$  in this analysis. The rest of the operations can be summarized for each method in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Comparison of the proposed algorithm with the previous methods in terms of number of ciphertext multiplications, multiplicative depth and output size.

	Naïve Greedy	Direct	<b>Our Proposed Method</b>
Ciphertext Multiplications	$\mathcal{O}(2^N)$	$\mathcal{O}(N \log N)$	$\mathcal{O}(N)$
Multiplicative Depth	$\mathcal{O}(\log N)$	$\mathcal{O}(\log N)$	$\mathcal{O}(\log N)$

The Naïve Greedy implements the Greedy Sort in a straightforward manner, hence the multiplications can be counted in the  $\theta_{r,i}$  computations. In order to

find the binary place indicators for an arbitrary element  $X_i$ , we need to compute  $\theta_{0,i}, \theta_{1,i}, \dots, \theta_{N-1,i}$  as in Equation 2 with each one contributing

$$\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \binom{N-1}{k} = 2^{N-1}$$

multiplications.

Direct Sort has two steps that involve ciphertext multiplications: summation of columns of  $M$  and equality check of the rank values. The first is computed by using a Wallace Tree of  $N$  bits for each column. The latter is computed by using the bit-wise equality check circuit for  $\log N$  bits for each possible rank, i.e.  $N$  times. Therefore, total number of multiplications to find the rank of one element becomes  $\mathcal{O}(\log N) + \mathcal{O}(N \log N)$ .

Instead, the proposed method requires only  $N - 2$  ciphertext multiplications, in order to find a single rank.

## 5 Conclusion

In conclusion, our proposed method Polynomial Rank Sort performs significantly better than previous algorithms and provides a depth-optimized circuit for homomorphic sorting. It reduces the number of ciphertext multiplications to  $\mathcal{O}(N^2)$  for sorting a full array. Furthermore, it is a refined algorithm suitable for parallelization.

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